Abstract-We consider the concert queueing game in the fluid framework, where the service facility opens at a specified time, the customers are particles in a fluid with homogeneous costs that are linear and additive in the waiting time and in the time to service completion, and wish to choose their own arrival times so as to minimize their cost. This problem has recently been analyzed under the assumption that the total volume of arriving customers is deterministic and known beforehand. We consider here the more plausible setting where this volume may be random, and only its probability distribution is known beforehand. In this setting, we identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium and show that under it the customer behavior significantly differs from the case where such uncertainties do not exist. While, in the latter case, the equilibrium profile is uniform, in the former case it is uniform up to a point and then it tapers off. We also solve the associated optimization problem to determine the socially optimal solution when the central planner is unaware of the actual amount of arrivals. Interestingly, the Price of Anarchy (ratio of the social cost of the equilibrium solution to that of the optimal one) for this model turns out to be two exactly, as in the deterministic case, despite the different form of the social and equilibrium arrival profiles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Customers going to a rock concert or a movie theater need to resolve the following dilemma: Going early involves encoun tering a rush to get the best seats, going late involves sacrifice in the viewing experience. Evening commuters often face the trade-off between reaching home late from work or getting caught in the evening rush hour. Similar trade-offs govern queueing behavior in a busy cafeteria: People may prefer to eat as soon as the cafeteria opens at lunch time or they may choose to stay hungry and eat later when the waiting is less but the food quality may deteriorate. We refer to this 'queue arrival timing problem' as the concert queueing problem (see [lO] and [9] ). This problem is especially important when the number of potential customers involved is large. Ty pically, even when the size of population coming to a queue is large, it may still be substantially variable.
In this paper we consider this concert queueing problem in the fluid framework. Here each customer is a particle or a point in a continuum that needs to decide when to arrive to a queue where the server opens service at a specified time. The arrivals are non-cooperative, their cost structure is homogeneous and is linear and additive in the waiting time and in the time to service. The customers can arrive before or after the server opens for service, and are served in a first come first serve manner. This problem was recently considered in [lO] , where the total volume of customers is assumed to be fixed and known beforehand to arriving customers. This fluid model approximates the actual scenario where the total number of customers is finite but large and more or less constant (see [11] for a proof of convergence of the equilibrium profile in the discrete queueing model to that of the associated fluid model as the number of customers increases to infinity). This basic fluid model has been extended to multiple classes of customers [9] , parallel and serial queues [8] , and different opening and closing conditions [7] . In this paper, we analyze a more realistic scenario in the fluid setting, where the volume of arriving customers may be random, and only its probability distribution is known upfront.
In [lO] and [9] , the authors show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium arrival profile that corresponds to customers arriving uniformly over a specified interval. They further show that the price of anarchy (the ratio of the social cost of the worst Nash equilibrium to the optimal one) in their framework equals 2. As mentioned above, we extend this framework to allow for random arrival volume. Under this extension, we derive the unique synunetric equilibrium profile for customer arrival instances. We note that this differs significantly from the arrival profile when volume of arrivals is fixed. Specifi cally, we show that in the random setting, the unique Nash equilibrium profile is uniform only up to a point and then it tapers off as a function of time. Thus, customers have a higher arrival density in the beginning of the arrival period than at its end. We also explicitly evaluate the cost incurred by each customer in equilibrium, and verify that uncertainly in the arrival volume tends to increase this cost.
We also consider the problem of determining the socially optimal solution in this setting when the central planner is unaware of the volume of the arriving traffic, but can dictate the distribution of arrival times for those who do arrive. This problem may be of independent interest in various settings. For instance, when a central planner gives appointments to arriving customers and a random amount of customers show up. It is also useful in ascertaining the level of inefficiency of the equilibrium profile through the computation of PoA. We note that unlike in the case where the arrival volume is fixed, when it is allowed to be random, the social optimal solution may involve queueing under certain scenarios. Interestingly, unlike in the equilibrium solution, under the social optimal solution the arrival profile of each customer is indeed uniform. Also, the PoA turns out to exactly equal two, as in the deterministic arrival volume case.
Regarding related literature, a comprehensive overview of game theoretic (or strategic) decision problems in queueing systems may be found in the monograph [5] . However, it does not address fluid models. Equilibrium flows in transporta tion and conununication networks (also known as the selfish routing problem) have been extensively studied following Wardrop's seminal 1952 paper [18] ; see [16] for a survey of that literature. This model essentially considers a fluid flow problem which views users as infinitesimal and selfish, similar to our model, but does not address timing decisions which are the focus of this paper. Bottleneck fluid models similar to ours have been extensively studied the transportation setting, starting with a seminal paper by Vickrey [17] . In the basic model, also known as the morning commute problem, a known volume of infinitesimal users are served on a FCFS basis by a fixed-rate server, and need to choose their staring time so that their service ends as close as possible to a nominal arrival time. Here a cost is typically incurred both for late and for early arrival. For later developments on this model see, e.g., [12] , [13] and their references. The specific effects of uncertainty in population size have been considered in [1], which is perhaps the closest work to ours. In their set-up penalties are imposed for early and late service completions (relative to a nominal target time, common to all), while we only penalize for lateness. They also explicitly model demand and supply to determine the distribution of volume of customers that show up. Our analysis on the other hand is substantially more detailed. We also determine explicitly the socially optimal solution not considered in those papers. In a non-fluid setting, we finally mention the work in [4] , [6] , [11] on similar strategic arrival timing problems in queues with a finite customer population and stochastic service times. As may be expected, the analysis there becomes more complicated and the results less explicit.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we develop the mathematical framework for the concert queuing game involving random volume of arrivals having homogeneous and linear costs. In Section 3, we identify a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium in this framework. In Section 4 we identify the socially optimal profile and calculate the PoA. We explicitly solve for the equilibrium and social profiles for a few examples in Section 5. We end with brief conclusion in Section 6. The volume of customers that actually arrive to the queue is a random variable A E [0, (0), with distribution function Go.
We assume that A has a finite mean. All arriving customers are admitted to the queue, and are served in a first come first serve manner.
Service starts at time zero, and commences thereafter as a constant rate* fL > O. The costs incurred by each customer are taken to be linear and additive in waiting time and time to service. For ease of analysis we restrict ourselves to customers behaving sYlmnetrically, in that they select their arrival times from the same distribution F (this in fact is not crucial here since in the fluid setting it is only the aggregate arrival profile that matters; for more on this see [9] QA , F(t) = XA , F(t) -m in{ O, ��� XA , F(S)}. 
Also note that the distribution of the volume of arrivals as seen by an arriving customer differs from Go, and is given by the tilted distribution G defined by
* We consider here the service rate to be deterministic. However, most of the following results are applicable to the case of stochastic /-l, as the ratio A//-l is the main quantity that appear in the analysis.
(see [3] or [1], for example). This length biased distribution captures the fact that a particular arrival is more likely when the total number of arrivals is large.
The unconditional expected cost seen by a customer if she arrives at time t then equals (recalling that a + (3 = 1)
and the expected cost of a customer who selects her arrival time by sampling from probability distribution H is EC H , F = l: [100 WA , F(t) dG( >" ) + (3 t] dH(t).
Note that the expectation here is taken with respect to the length-biased distribution G.
Our arrival game therefore corresponds to a volume A of arrivals showing up at the server facility and each selecting her arrival time as an independent sample from F, a probability distribution over the reals. We refer to F as the arrival profile.
The following definition of symmetric Nash equilibrium is standard:
Definition 1: An arrival profile F is a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) if, for every distribution H, ECF , F :s: EC H , F .
Equivalently, there exists a set TF of F-measure 1 and a constant Ce such that (i) ECF(t)?: Ce for all t, (ii) ECF(t) = Ce for all t E TF.
Here Ce denotes the expected cost incurred by a customer that arrives with probability 1 along the set TF. Customer, were it to arrive at any other time, will incur expected cost that is at least Ce.
To see the equivalence, first suppose that for a given F and TF, (i) and (ii) above hold. Then, EC H , F ?: Ce for every distribution H, while ECF , F = Ceo On the other hand, if given a candidate F for SNE, violation of (i) clearly implies that F is not an SNE. Violation of (i i) again implies that there exists a set of positive F -measure where the cost is less than it is at another set of positive F-measure. Again, it is easy to that such an F is not an SNE.
Recall that the support of a probability measure is the smallest closed set that has probability 1. Let TF denote the support of the probability measure associated with an arrival profile F.
The following regularity assumption will be invoked in parts of our analysis. A similar assumption was used in [11] . While imposing reasonable restrictions on the arrival time distributions that may be employed by the customers, it makes our search for the equilibrium distribution substantially simpler.
Assumption 1: The support TF of SNE profile F can lo cally (i.e., on any finite interval) be represented as a finite union of closed intervals and points.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section through a series of lemmas we develop necessary conditions that an SNE must satisfy. We then show the existence of a unique SNE. Let tb = {inf x : x E T F} and te = {sup x : x E TF} be the end points of the support of F, corresponding to the first and last arrival times. The following properties of an SNE are easily seen.
Lemma 1: An SNE profile F is a continuous function of t (i.e., the corresponding probability measure has no point masses). In addition, the expected cost ECF(t) is constant over the support TF. Furthermore, -00 < tb < 0 and 0 < te < 00 (hence, 0 < F(O) < 1).
Proof The first claim is easily seen as if the profile had a point mass at time t, then there must exist an E > 0 such that ECF(t -E ) < ECF(t).
To see the second claim note that since F is continuous, the waiting time WA , F(t) is continuous for each>.. so that the cost ECF(t) is a continuous function of t. Hence, (3) extends to the support TF.
Next, tb > -00 follows as ECF(t) increases to 00 as t ..I -00. To see that tb < 0 note that if it were larger than or equal to zero, then a customer arriving at time zero would incur zero wait, hence would incur a cost that is strictly smaller than any customer arriving at a positive time, leading to a contradiction.
The assertion that 0 < te < 00 can be verified similarly.
• Let Til. = inf{ t ?: 0 : AF(t) < fL t} (4) denote the first time after zero when the server starts to serve at less than full rate fL, given that the arrival volume is A. Note that QII. , F( TA) = O. Since F(O) > 0, it follows that Til. > 0 for A > O. Lemma 2 below is important for our analysis: It states that no queue will build up beyond Til.. Lemma 2: For an SNE profile F, QII. , F(T) = 0 for all T?: Til..
Proof Suppose that there exists T > Til., so that Q II. , F (T) > O. Without loss of generality we may assume that T E T F. Then due to continuity of F, (and hence through continuity of Q II. , F), there exists s ?: Til. denoting the last time before T that QA , F(t) equals zero. Clearly, if it were known that A is the arrival volume, then arriving at s would be preferable to arriving at T, contradicting T E TF. We need to show that this is the case also when the arrival volume is stochastic.
From (1), it follows that and hence, for t ::; TA, and WA,F(t) = 0 otherwise. Proof Observe that for t < 0, QA,F(t) = AF(t) and hence (6) follows, as -t is the customer wait before the server becomes active, and AF(t)j p, is the remaining queueing delay. For t ?: 0 the required equality follows from Lemma 2, which implies that the server will be working at full rate on 0 ::; t ::; �.
.
Fi�) strictly increases as a function of t for all t E TF.
Proof From Corollary 1, it follows that for A < i(�),
J .\ ? *'r P, Through integration by parts, letting G(A) = 1 -G(A) for each A, this may be re-expressed as
p, t *'r
Now, x f l/X G(A)dA is clearly a non-decreasing function of
x. Since ECF(t) is constant for all t E TF, the result follows.
• Lemma 4: An SNE profile F has a right continuous derivative in TF given by F'
Proof Recall that
Note that on TF, the derivative of ECF(t) in t equals zero. Hence, through simple manipulations it follows that for t E TF, wherever F is differentiable (that is, almost everywhere)
Since, the RHS is right continuous, there exists a right continuous version of F' in TF.
• Remark 1: Let 9 denote the set of points of discontinuity of the length-biased volume distribution G (which is countable at most). Then the points of discontinuity of F' correspond to times t at which i(�) E g. 
Then, since i(�) is strictly increasing with t, and G is a non-increasing function, this implies that G (i(;�)) = G (i(�� ) ) = (3. However, since F' (t3) > 0 implies from (7) that G (A�� ) ) > (3, since Fi�) strictly increases with t, we have the desired contradiction.
To see (8) , note that since (iI, t 2 ) is not in TF, it follows from its definition that EC F (t) is differentiable along this interval (with F(t) set as a constant independent of t) so that ECF'(ti) ?: o. It then follows that G (;ttt )) ::; (3, and therefore (8) follows since G is right continuous.
To see (9) , note that under Assumption 1, F' (tt) ?: 0, so that
Again, since F is continuous and G is right continuous, (9) follows.
• Let Al ?: 0 denote the left limit of support of G, corre sponding to the minimal possible arrival volume. Recalling the definition of TA from (4), T.\t is then the first time beyond o that the server starts serving at less than full capacity, for some arrival volume. Also define A * = inf { A : G ( A) ?: a} (10) (recall that 0 < a < 1 is the normalized waltlng cost coefficient). Evidently G(A*) = a, unless A* is a discontinuity point of G. . .\ *
(1) te = -;; .
(ii) The equilibrium cost Ce is given by 1 1 00 - 
From (11) and ( 12), (i) follows when G( A) = (3 has at most one solution. When it has multiple solutions (which must lie on an interval), it follows that G( fL te) = (3. Then, fL te = A * because by definition of te, there exists a sequence tn t te with F'(tn) > 0 for all n sufficiently large. This implies that G (f(�:)) > (3 for all n sufficiently large, so that fL te = A *.
(ii) follows by noting that
r: G(A)dA + (3t. (13) for all t E TF and evaluating this cost at teo (iii) is obvious. (iv) follows from (7), after noting that AI F(t) 2: fL t for t :s; TAL so that for such a t, G (A� ) ) = 1.
(v) simply restates (7).
(vi) can be seen by differentiating F'(t) in (iv) and (v). The conditions (i) -(vii) specify the necessary conditions that must apply to any SN E. We now employ a monotonicity argument to show that there exists a unique arrival profile F( t)
that satisfies these conditions, and is in fact the unique SN E.
Consider the function
For 0 < t :s; te, the function h(x, t) increases from less than zero to infinity as x increases from zero to infinity. In particular, for any 0 < t :s; te, there exists a unique F(t) so that h(F(t), t) = O. It is easy to see that for 0 < t < te,
. 00
Since, for 0 < t < te, !1 x h(F(t), t) > 0, by implicit function theorem (see, e.g., Luenberger 1984) this F(t) satisfies the ode (7) for 0 < t < teo The remaining conditions on F(t) for t 2: 0 follow from simple algebraic manipulations in (14) .
•
Remark 2:
We may now examine the effect of randomized arrival volume on the equilibrium cost. Consider the determin istic model with a deterministic arrival volume Ao that equals Eo(A) (note that in computing the last expectation, we use the true distribution Go rather than the biased distribution G). It is easily seen from (13) that the equilibrium cost equals fiAo M (see also [10] ). On the other hand, in the stochastic model,
(note that E denotes the expectation with respect to the biased distribution G). Thus, the equilibrium cost with random A is larger that in the corresponding deterministic model.
IV. S OCIAL O PTIMALITY
The socially optimal solution to our problem may be con sidered under two scenarios: 1) The central planner knows the realized A and uses this information in selecting the arrival profile F for the arriving customers; 2) The central planner is only aware of the distribution Go of A, and plans the customer arrival profile F before observing A. In the first case, when there the arrival volume is A, the arrival profile corresponds to a uniform distribution along the interval [0, AI fL l and the associated total cost equals f3 AI fJ (see [9] Consider then the second problem, where a central planner is given the distribution Go of the arrival volume, and wishes to specify the arrival profile F(t) so as to minimize the expected social cost. It is easy to see that an optimal arrival profile would put zero mass before the opening time. Thus, our objective is to minimize where and h = 1 dGo()") 1 00 C).. ,F(t).,dF(t) C).. ,F(t) = a W).. ,F(t) + f3(W).. ,F(t) + t) = W).. ,F(t) + f3 t
Theorem 2: The socially optimal arrival profile F that minimizes J F is given by the uniform distribution F'(t) = J!:... )., *' where)" * is defined in (10).
The proof is given below. We note that the socially optimal arrival profile shares the same endpoint te with the Nash equilibrium solution. However, the starting point and shape is different.
Under the derived solution, the actual queue size is given by Q).. ,F(t) = U. -l ) + fJt for 0 � t � te = ).,* IfJ. At time te the queue length equals ()., -).,*) + and thereafter for t 2: te it equals
We illustrate this graphically in Figure IV .
We also point out that the last theorem and its proof are somewhat deeper than what may first meet the eye. Using essentially the same proof, it may be shown that the optimal arrival density F' (t) is proportional to the instantaneous ser vice rate fJ( t) even if that rate is not constant in time. However, we will not deal here with this more general case.
A. Price of Anarchy
Substituting the expression for socially optimal F(t) in (16), the socially optimal cost J* can be seen to be J* = � r oo G()")d)" + £).,*.
2fJ}).. * 2fJ
From Theorem l(ii), the Nash Equilibrium cost is given by Queue length process under socially optimal profile. ql and q2 correspond to scenarios where arriving).. > ).. *. q3 corresponds to ).. ::; ).. * .
Therefore, PoA = cel Cs = 2 in this case.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof proceeds through several steps.
1. An alternative form for the cost function: The treatment of the optimization problem is greatly simplified by expressing the cost differently. Start from 1 00 C).. ,F(t).,dF(t) = 1
(W).. ,F(t) + f3t)"dF(t). (20)
For the integral over W).. ,F we have:
This is just the well-known relation between (linear) waiting cost and holding cost. It follow from 1 00 W).. ,F(t).,dF(t) = 1: l� o l{t::;s<t + WA,F(t)}ds )"dF(t), (22) = 1:(1: l{t::;s<t + W\, F(t)} ).,dF(t))ds , (23)
For the integral over t we have the standard formula for the expected value of a positive random variable:
and
2. A relaxed variational problem: In order to minimize the cost (27), we first formulate and solve a relaxed optimization problem, and show that the solution to that problem also solves where in (39) we used the relation dG(A) We note that Q can be considered as a (possibly negative) queue size in a system that continues service at full rate J.L even when the queue is negative.
or Consider then the modified cost function J F :s: J F :
where k.\(x, t) = (A x -J.Lt) + + ;3 A(1 -x).
(32)
This can be written as where
K(F(t), t) = 1 k.\(F(t), t) dGO(A). (34)
This can be seen to be in the standard form of a variational problem, with cost function K, optimizing over the (convex) set of probability distribution functions F (i.e, subject to d F ?:
It is further easily seen that k.\(x, t) is a convex function in x (for any fixed t). It follows then that J F is a convex function of F. This implies that any solution that satisfies the first-order necessary conditions is a global optimum (e.g., see [15] ). It is therefore sufficient to show that the proposed solution satisfies the first-order conditions, as we do below.
3. The first variation: Let EH(t) be a continuous variation around F(t), with H(O) = H(oo) = O. We will also require that F'(t) + EH'(t) ?: 0 for E > 0 small enough. From (31),
almost everywhere, hence 5. Back to the original problem: We finally observe the solution F* (t) = J.Lt j A *, 0 :s: t :s: t* of the relaxed problem is also an optimal solution to the original problem. Indeed, under this arrival profile the original queue size Q .\ , F * (t) has at most one busy period that starts at t = 0 (the busy period exists if A > A *, � nd otherwise Q .\ , F * (t) == 0), which implies that Q.\f * (t) = Q.\ , F * (t) + , and JF * = JF * . However, since J F ?: J F holds in general, it follows that F* minimizes J F as well. D
V. EXAMPLES
In this section we illustrate the derived equilibrium and socially optimal profiles on two examples: when G is a two point distribution as well as when G is uniformly distributed. Note that the latter corresponds to GO(A) proportional to A -I over an interval.
A. Distribution G is Supported on Two Points
Consider the setting where the number of arrivals can take two possible values under the length biased distribution G : Al with probability P.\l or Ah > Al with probability P.\ h = I-p.\l· The profiles depend on whether P.\ h cx > p.\l;3 or not. This also leads to increase in deviation from uniform distribu tion in the arrival profile. These are depicted in Figure 2 . In Figure 3 , we keep the variance of the uniform distribution the same but change the mean. Thus, (Ah -AI) is kept fixed while (Ah + AI) is increased. As the mean increases, the curves can be seen to become closer to the uniform distribution, since the randomness becomes relatively less significant. In Figure   4 , Al and Ah are fixed but we change the cost of time to service parameter /3 (in all these figures a + /3 = 1). As /3 increases, the customers arrive earlier and have to wait more.
Under the socially optimal profile A* = C -1(a ) = Aha + Al/3 which again implies that te = t(Aha + Al/3 ). 
VI. C ONCLUSION
In this article we considered the concert queueing problem in the fluid framework where the arriving volumes were random. We derived the unique equilibrium arrival profile in this setting and noted that while this profile is uniformly distributed when the arrival volume is fixed, when it is random, the arrival profile is constant up to a point and thereafter tapers down. We also derived the arrival profile that minimizes the overall social welfare cost. Interestingly, this turned out to be uniformly distributed. Somewhat surprisingly, the price of anarchy remained equal to 2 even in the scenario where the arrival volumes were random.
There are many directions related to presence of uncertainty in the fluid system that require further research. For instance, how does the system behavior change when the service rates are variable, both deterministically and randomly? It would be interesting to see how random server start times impact the system behavior. One generalization that is of obvious interest is to consider heterogeneous arrivals with non-linear costs. 
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